The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing by Le Breton, Michel et al.
The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to
IAC through Ehrhart's Polynomials and m-Dependence
Michel Le Bretony Dominique Lepelleyz Hatem Smaouix
April 2014
Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a general model of a random electorate
of N voters described by their preferences over two alternatives. Our model will admit,
as special cases, the two most popular models in the literature on power measurement.
The rst, one called Impartial Culture (IC) is the basis of the celebrated Banzhaf power
index (Banzhaf (1965, 1966, 1968)). It assumes that the preferences of the voters over the
two alternatives are independent and equiprobable: correlation among the preferences of the
voters is totally precluded. The second one, called Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) which
has been pioneered independently in voting theory by Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981),
Good and Mayer (1975)1, Fishburn and Gehrlein (1976) and Kuga and Nagatani (1974) is
the basis (as forcefully demonstrated by Stran (1977, 1988)) of another celebrated power
index due to Shapley and Shubik (Shapley and Shubik (1954), Stran (1977, 1988)). The
IAC model introduces correlation among voters and the specic distributional assumption
which is considered implies that the real random variable dened as the number of voters
supporting the rst alternative is uniform over all feasible integers. From a computational
perspective, this distributional property of the IAC model makes it very handy as compared
to some other models and probably explains its success. Further, as noted convincingly by
Chamberlain and Rothschild, the IAC model is more attractive than the IC model in the
sense that the electoral predictions of the IAC models don't display a discontinuity in the
neighborhood of the outcome of a tied election.
Given a random electorate , the power of a voter is dened as the probability of being
pivotal2 i.e. as the probability of the event \There is a majority in favor of the rst alternative
i that voter supports that alternative". Given that we will focus on a symmetric simple
game (the ordinary majority game), if the model of random electorate  is fully symmetric
(i.e. if the preferences are interchangeable), then all voters will have the same power denoted
Piv(;N). Both the IC and the IAC models are symmetric. For the IC model, this denes
the Banzhaf power index Piv(IC;N) while for the IAC model this denes the Shapley-
Shubik power index Piv(IAC;N). It is well known that Piv(IC;N) and Piv(IAC;N) are





The main purpose of this paper is to continue the exploration of the implications of cor-
relation on the asymptotic behavior of the power index. Precisely, we will consider a general
family of models of random electorate  and study the asymptotic behavior of Piv(;N)
1We discover this important paper while reading Myatt (2012). Their result was rediscovered by Cham-
berlain and Rothschild.
2Good and Mayer (1975) refers to this as the ecacy of a vote.
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with respect to N . Our motivation to do so is to depart from the IAC model which assumes
that the correlation is the same for all pairs of voters in the population. It is likely that the
intensity of the correlation between the votes of i and j will depend upon some character-
istics of i and j suggesting that the correlation may vary from one pair to another. Most
of the paper will however be based on a particular pattern of heterogeneity. Precisely, we
will assume that the voters are partitioned into groups and that: correlation is positive and
identical for any pair of voters belonging to the same group and null for any pair of voters
belonging to two dierent groups. We will assume that within each group the correlation is
dened as in the IAC model. This gives the IC and the IAC models as special cases: the IC
model emerges when all the groups are singletons and the IAC model arises when there is a
unique group which is then the entire population.
While particular, this model is general enough to cover many situations. We will oer a
separate treatment of two polar cases. The rst case is the case where there is a bound on
the size of the groups; this bound does not depend upon the size of the population. This
assumption is well suited to capture local interactions (within the family or the workplace for
instance). The second case is the case where there is a xed number of groups; this means
that the size of the groups grows with the size of the population. This assumption is well
suited to describe large scale interactions (special interest groups, geographical territories,
electoral districts, countries if the population under scrutiny is multinational,...). After
oering some general results, we proceed to the study of these two cases. The analysis
of the two cases uses dierent techniques. When  describes the local case, the use of
some local versions of the Central Limit Theorem allows to estimate Piv(;N). We show
that it is of order 1p
N
and we calculate explicitly Lim
N!1
p
NPiv(;N). In contrast, when
 describes the global case, our estimation of Piv(;N) is based on dierent mathematical
techniques. We approach the problem quite dierently using combinatorial tools which
amounts to derive some polynomials known as Ehrhart's polynomials and to compute the
volumes of some polytopes. We show that Piv(;N) is of order 1
N
and we calculate explicitly
Lim
N!1
NPiv(;N) in some specic cases.
Related Literature
The partition random model explored in this paper has been suggested by Stran (1977)
under the name partial homogeneity. He suggests this model as an alternative to the existing
IC and IAC models but does not derive any general result. Instead, he proceeds to some
numerical calculations of the probability of being pivotal in the Canadian constitutional
amendment process3. Stran writes: \In the Canadian consitution example, it might be that
3This game has 10 players (the Canadian provinces) and is not the ordinary majority game analysed in
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neither the independence assumption nor the homogenity asssumption describe the situation
very well. British Columbia and Quebec, for example, might reasonably be expected to
behave independently, while the four Atlantic provinces may have common interests and
might reasonably be considered to judge proposed constitutional amendment by a common
set of values. The most reasonable thing to do might be to partition the provinces into
subsets whose members are homogenous among themselves, but behave independently of
the members of other subsets".
Chamberlain and Rothschild also consider the case of a partition into two groups and
study the asymptotics of the probability of being pivotal under some general conditions:
the random draws of the parameter p (denoting the probability that any individual votes
for the rst alternative) in each of the two groups do not necessarily result from a uniform
distribution (a feature shared with Good and Mayer) and the draws are not necessarily
independent among the two groups.
Our model of correlation among voters aims to contribute to dierent branches of the
literature. On one hand, it extends the existing studies of the implications of correlation
on power measurement. Knowing the exact magnitude of the probability of being pivotal is
interesting for itself but this information is also essential for the design of the optimal weights
of representatives, as argued convincingly by Barbera and Jackson (2006). They discuss a
block model which is quite similar to the model of partitions which is considered here except
for the fact that instead of IAC, they assume perfect correlation within each block/group.
On the other hand, our model aims also to be a step towards the analysis of the implica-
tions of correlation in a general model of elections. The general (as the number of alternatives
is arbitrary) model of random electorate pioneered by Weber (1978, 1995) assumes indepen-
dence across individual preferences. Similarly, the model of Myerson and Weber (1993) and
the general Poisson model developed by Myerson in a series of papers (1998, 2000) postulates
independence. In the case where there are two alternatives and the possibility of absten-
tion, the probability of being pivotal betwen the two alternatives plays a critical role in the
decision of a rational voter to participate to the electoral process. To the best of our knowl-
edge, Evren (2012) and Myatt (2012) are the unique papers where correlation is the driving
force of models which explains fairly accurately the turnout rates in relative large electoral
districts. Myatt writes \Most established models of turnout include a problematic feature:
voter's type (and so their decisions) are independent draws from a known distribution. This
feature is also present in models of strategic voting..."4. Evren considers a slightly more
this paper. He performs numerical calculations for several dierent partitions including the partition where
all the provinces, except Quebec, are together.
4For a more detailed discussion of this important point, we refer the reader to the introduction of Myatt's
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complicated type space as he assumes that voters can either be selsh or altruistic. Both
Evren and Myatt's papers demontrate convincingly that aggregate uncertainty (a generalized
form of IAC) is essential to resolve the turnout paradox.
2 The Model of a Random Electorate
A random electorate is a triple (N ; X; ) where N is a nite set of individuals (voters,...),
X is a nite set of alternatives (candidates, parties,...) and  is a probability distribution
on PN where P is the set of linear orders over X. In the case where X consists of two
alternatives say 0 and 1, the set P contains two preferences which will be coded 0 and 1 and
PN = f0; 1gN where N denotes the cardinality of N i.e. the number of voters. The rst
popular random electorate model, called Impartial Culture (IC), is dened by  (P ) = 1
2N
for all proles of preferences P = (P1; P2; :::; PN) in f0; 1gN . The IC model assumes that
the preferences of the voters are independent Bernoulli random variables with a parameter
p equal to 1
2
(i.e. the electorate is not biased towards a particular candidate). In contrast,
the second popular random electorate model, called Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) is
dened by  (P ) = 1
(N+1)(Nk)
for all proles of preferences P = (P1; P2; :::; PN) in f0; 1gN
such that #N0 (P ) = k where N0 (P )  fi 2 N : Pi = 0g. In the IAC model, the events
Ek 
n
P 2 f0; 1gN : # fi 2 N : Pi = 0g = k
o
for k = 0; 1; :::; N are equally likely
A social choice mechanism is a mapping 	 from f0; 1gN into [0; 1] where 	(P ) denotes
the probability of choosing candidate 0 when the prole of preferences is P . In this binary
setting5, we will not make any distinction between preferences and behavior. There is no
room for strategic behavior here: if we interpret 	 as a direct revelation game, then voting
sincerely according to his/her preference is the unique dominant strategy. Further, we will
focus6 on the standard majority mechanism Maj dened as follows:
Maj(P ) =
8<:
0 if #N0 (P ) < N
2




if #N0 (P ) = N
2
If N is odd, the third eventuality never arises and the mechanism is deterministic. If
N is even, the third alternative arises when the electorate is split into two groups of equal
paper. His paper contains, as a rst step, an extension of the generalized (as the distribution is not necessarily
uniform) IAC model to a multinomial setting.
5In this binary setting, a social choice mechanism is dened alternatively by a simple game (Taylor and
Zwicker (1999)). A simple game is a monotonic family of coalitions W. The mechanism is then dened as
follows: 	(P ) = 0 i fi 2 N : Pi = 0g 2 W.
6In the last section, we will outline the diculties in generalizing our formula to arbitrary simple games
like those considered in the power measurement literature.
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size and the tie is broken fairly. The whole paper is about evaluating the probability of an
event. We will say that voter i 2 N is pivotal if either #N0 (P i) = N 12 when N is odd
or #N0 (P i) =
N
2
or #N0 (P i) =
N 2
2
when N is even. We denote by Ei this event and
Piv(; i) is the probability of Ei i.e. Piv(; i) =  (Ei). There is a slight dierence between
the even and odd cases. In the odd case, the preference of i will be the social choice when i
is pivotal. In contrast, in the even case, if i is pivotal and say on the 0 side, his preference
will be for sure the social preference if #N0 (P i) =
N
2
and will be the social preference with
probability 1
2
if #N0 (P i) =
N 2
2
. Up to this qualication, the two cases will be analyzed
with similar methods.
When the simple game is symmetric, if the probability measure is symmetric, then
Piv(; i) does not depend on i and will be denoted shortly by Piv (). Piv () has been
calculated for the two popular models of random electorate which have just been dened.















N is even. For the IAC model, Piv () = 1
N















In this paper, we assume that the electorateN is partitioned intoK groupsN1;N2; :::;NK
i.e. [1kKNk = N and Nk \ Nk0 = ? for all k; k0 such that k 6= k0. We will denote by
Nk the size of group k:
PK
k=1Nk = N and without loss of generality we assume that
N1  N2  :::  NK .We consider the following random electorate model.
We assume that the preferences of any voter i from group Nk is the realization of a
Bernoulli random variable with parameter pk and that conditional on pk, the preferences
of any two voters in that group are independent. We assume that the coordinates of the
vector (p1; p2; :::; pK) are the realizations of K independent random variables with a uniform
























where  ( M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK) denotes the set of decompositions of the integer M into

































where  (M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK) denotes the cardinality of  ( M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK) i.e.
the number of decompositions of the integer M into K ordered integers under the constraint
that the kth integer does not exceed Rk.



































































































corresponds to the fact that when i is pivotal, there is only a chance of 1
2
to
be eective i.e. a chance of 1
2
that the tie is broken in his favor. The interest of the two
formulas above lies in the fact that the calculation of the pivot probabilities is equivalent
to a well dened combinatorial problem which amounts to count the number of possible
decompositions of a given integer into K integers under some constraints. Note however
that there are at most K cells i.e. K non zero integers in the decomposition. This means
that the problem is dierent from the problem of counting the number of partitions of a
given integer. Further, for each cell, there is an upper bound on the integer for that cell.
Let us check quickly that the IC and IAC models correspond to two extreme special cases
of this general framework. The IC value is attached to the case where K = N i.e. where the
partition structure consists of N singletons:




























. The IAC value is attached to the case where
K = 1 i.e. where the partition structure consists of a single set: the set N :















; N   1

= 1:
An alternative approach to the counting problem is based on probability. Let Xik denote
the Bernoulli random variable describing the preference of voter i in group k and let Sk andbS denote respectively the sums Pj2Nk Xjk and PKk=1Pj2Nk Xjk = PKk=1 Sk. With these
notations, we can express the pivot probabilities as follows:
Piv(; k) = 
bS i = N   1
2














when N is even
This probabilistic approach will be very useful when we will focus on the asymptotic
behavior of Piv(; k) when N tends to innity. Note that all the random variables Xik are
8
symmetric in the sense that Pr(Xik = 0) = Pr(Xik = 1) =
1
2











and V ar [Xik] =
1
4
. But two random variables Xik and Xjl
are independent i k 6= l. If not, we have:

















of correlation  is then equal to 1
3
.
3 The case of Many Small Groups
In this section, we will focus on the case where there is an exogenous upper bound S on the
size of the groups in the partition (N1;N2; :::;NK). This implies that as N gets large, then
the number of groups increases.
To motivate the general result which will be presented hereafter, it is instructive to
consider the case where S = 2. In any such partition structure , the groups are either
singletons or pairs. We can think of this partition as describing a society where there are
singles and couples but no other family types. Consider the case where N is even and all
the groups are exactly of size 2. From (1.b), we deduce that:












































integers chosen in f0; 1; 2g
amounts rst to choose how many pairs k we choose among N 2
2














  2k singletons which can be chosen among N
2










. After collecting the terms, we obtain the expression
reported above.
Calculating the above sum is not an immediate combinatorial exercise8 and we will mostly
focus on the asymptotic behavior of Piv().
7bxc denotes the integer part of x.



































The following table contains some numerical values of (N) which supports this conjec-
ture:
N 102 202 1002 5002 100002
(N) 0.69015 0.69056 0.6909 0.69097 0.69098
Table 1: Values of (N)


























The following table contains some numerical values of (N) which supports this guess:
N 102 202 1002 10002 100002
(N) 0.69525 0.69314 0.69143 0.69103 0.69099
Table 1 bis: Values of (N)
We now prove a generalized version of the conjecture. To proceed, we use a probabilistic
approach. We assume that all the groups have a size smaller than S and we will be interested
in societies where the set of voters is partitioned into groups of size s where s runs from 1
to S. We will consider societies where N gets indenitely large but such that the proportion
of the population in each type of group (described by its size) remains invariant in the
population growth process. We will denote by s the proportion of voters in a group of size
s. We assume that s = sK
s
K




The initial society contains Ks groups of size s. For any integer R, its Rth replica has N
voters where N is dened as follows:





For all R and all i = 1; 2; :::; N(R), we arrange the random variables XRi describing the
individual votes in the Rth replica in a triangular array9 dened as follows: the rst RK1
variables describe the vote of voters in groups of size 1, the next 2RK2 variables describe
the votes of voters in groups of size 2 and so on.
We obtain






V ar(XRi ) +
SX
s=1
RKss(s  1)Cov(XRi ; XRj )
where Cov(XRi ; X
R
j ) denotes the covariance between when i and j belong to the same
group. We have shown before that:
V ar(XRi ) =
1
4
























A random variable XRi is of type s if R
Ps 1
l=1 lK
l < i  R
Ps
l=1 lK
l. We pack the sRKs






ks is dened as
follows :








1sS;1kRKs (indexed by R) where the random
variables ZRks are independent. Hereafter, we will refer to Z
R
ks as a random variable of type
s. We note that all random variables are integer valued: the support of a random variable
of type s is f0; 1; :::; sg Let 1  i  N(R) be a member of a group of type s and for each




























j=2 1XRjs . The probability that i of type s is pivotal, Piv(R; s) is equal



















if N is even.
We note that the span of the random variables ZRkl for 1  l  S and 1  k  K l and
WRi is equal to 1. Further, the distribution functions of these random variables belong to
a nite set of cardinality at most S, are not degenerate and occur innitely often (except









. Let  > 0:






, we deduce from Petrov's theorem in Appendix 1 that
if R is large enough:  (R)Piv(R; s)  1p2
  






, we deduce from Petrov's theorem that if R







































tends to 1 when R tends to +1, we
deduce that if R is large enough: (R)Piv(R; s)  1p2
  :



















The random variable SRi = S
R XRi introduced in the proof of Proposition 1 counts the
number of votes in favor of 1 in the population without individual i. Proposition 1 provides







illustrate Proposition 1, consider the case of an electorate, denoted sR, where all the groups








2 (2 + s)
The following table lists a sample of values of the probability of being pivotal for a sample
of values of s.
s 1 2 3 4 5 ... 10p
NPiv(sR) 0.798 0.691 0.618 0.564 0.522 ... 0.399
Table 2:
p
N  Probability of being pivotal as a function of s
We can also handle mixed situations i.e. random electorates  where the sizes of the
groups dier across voters. For instance ,when the random electorate  is such and 1 = 0:2,
2 = 0:3; 3 = 0:4 and 4 = 0:1, we obtain : Piv(R) ' 0:658 85. We could interpret these
groups as family groups : singles, couples without children voting, couples with one children
voting, and so on.
The proof strategy of Proposition 1 based on Petrov's local Central Limit Theorem has
exploited the fact that the individuals could be packed in a regular way. We could imagine
a more general situation where the individuals could be arranged from left to right in such a
way that two individuals distant from each other by more that some given number m (which
may vary with the size of the population) vote independently. We could proceed as in the
proof of Proposition 1 i.e. pack together m consecutive individual random variables. Even
when m is xed, we have no guarantee that the number of distributions in the sequence of
random variables which is constructed through this packing process is nite and we cannot
therefore apply Petrov's theorem. To handle such more general situations, we need to appeal
to a more general local Central Limit Theorem10.
A dierent way to look at the probability of being pivotal of a small group consists in
considering a small group of size 
p
N where  > 0 is xed instead of a group of size 1 as


























1iN(R) is an arbitrary triangular array of Bernouilli random variables of pa-
rameter 1
2
. Let us assume that this triangular array is m(R)-dependent and such that for























Since the Bernouilli variables have moments of any order, we deduce from Berk's theorem







is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance v
where v  Lim
R!1
V ar(XR1 +:::+XRn )
N(R)
. We deduce that the probability of a group of relative size

p

































This weak version of the pivotality result holds in a much larger class of electorates. The
notion of m-dependency matches our intuitive notion of local interaction. The groups can
even have their size increasing slowly with N : for instance, M(R) = N(R)
1
4 is ne. What
is essential, as reected by the other two conditions of Berck's theorem, is to bound in an
appropriate way the variance of any pack of random variables and to have the variance of
the electorate to behave asymptotically as the size of the electorate. Let us insist that this
denition of a small group is relative i.e. the size of the group is small when divided by the
population of voters. Besides Proposition 1, we dont know if the above result holds more
generally when  decreases with N , in particular when  = 1p
N
.
4 The Case of Few Large Groups
In this section we consider the polar case of a society divided into a nite (possibly large)
number of groups. This means that as N gets larger and larger, the number of voters in
14
each group gets larger and larger. We could apply the probabilistic approach which has been
used in the preceding section. It was using extensively the observation that the sequence
of Bernoulli random variables describing the votes of the citizens was exhibiting a property
of m-dependence where m was independent of the size of the electorate. This approach
cannot be used here as assumption (iv) on the growth of m in Berk's theorem is not satised
when there is a nite number of groups. To circumvent this diculty, we will approach the
problem from a combinatorial angle and use quasi-polynomials, Ehrart's theory and some of
its developments11.
4.1 Ehrhart theory and Barvinok's algorithm
For xed values of K, the general problem of computing the number  (M;R1; :::; Rk; :::; RK)
can be phrased as counting the exact number of integer solutions of a system of linear inequal-
ities with integer coecients, where the variables are xk (k = 1; :::; K) and the parameters
are M and Rk (k = 1; :::; K). This system is :8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
xk  0 for all k = 1; :::; K







There is a well established mathematical theory for performing such a calculation, based
on the use of (parametric) polytopes and Ehrhart polynomials. Lepelley et al. (2008) and
Wilson and Pritchard (2007) were the rst to introduce these tools in probability calculations
under IAC hypothesis in voting theory. We refer to their papers for more details and we
limit ourself, in this paragraph, to a short presentation of Ehrhart theorem and its exten-
sions. Also, we only sketch the key idea of the algorithm we have used to compute Ehrhart
polynomials.
Consider a nite system of linear inequalities with integer coecients: Ax  b, where x
is in Rd, A is an m  d integer matrix, b an integer vector with m components and m the
number of independent linear inequalities. Let P be the set of all solutions of this system, P
11There is a voluminous literature on this topic Brion (1995, 1998). For more details on Ehrhart theory we
refer to Beck and Robins (2007) and for a general background on algorithms computing Ehrhart polynomials,
we recommend the technical report produced by Verdoolage et al. (2005).
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is called a rational polyhedron. If P is bounded, it is called a rational polytope. An extremal
point of P is called a vertex, and P can be dened equivalently as the convex hull of its
vertices. A simple case of parametric polytope is is the dilatation of a rational polytope P
by a positive integer parameter n: nP = fnxjx 2 Pg. Let LP be the function dened by
LP(n) = jnP \ Zdj, giving the number of integer points inside the dilated polytope nP. To
describe the general form of this function, we need the two following notions. A rational
periodic number, of period q, on the integer variable n is a function U : Z ! Q such that
U(n) = U(n0) whenever n  n0 mod q. A quasi-polynomial (or Ehrhart polynomial) on n is
a polynomial expression f(n) on the variable n, f(n) =
Pn
i=0 ci(n)n
i, where the coecients
ci(n) are rational periodic numbers on n. The period of a quasi-polynomial is the last com-
mon multiple (lcm) of the periods of its coecients.
Theorem (Ehrhart (1962)): Let P be a rational polytope in Rd. If P is d-dimensional,
then12:
1. The function L(P; n) is given by a degree-d quasi-polynomial.
2. The coecient of the leading term is independent of n and is equal to the volume of
P.
3. The period of the quasi-polynomial is a divisor of the lcm of the denominators of the
vertices of nP. When all the vertices of P have integral coordinates, LP(n) is simply
a polynomial.
The above result can be extended to more general situations with more than one para-
meter. Dene a (linearly) parameterized polyhedron as the solution set of a system of linear
inequalities where the constant terms in each constraint is an ane combination of a set of
integer parameters: Pp = fx 2 RdjAx  Cp + bg, where A and C are integer matrices, b
is an integer vector and p a vector of r integer parameters. When Pp is bounded for each
value of p, it will be called a parametric polytope. The coordinates of the vertices of a
parametric polytope are ane functions of the parameters. Each vertex only exists for a
subset of the possible parameter values. Separate regions of the vector parameter space Nr
where the vertices have stable expressions are called validity domains. Clauss and Loechner
(1998) consider the enumerator function E(Pp) that describes the number of integer points
12Note that P can be not full-dimensional; this is the case when the linear system describing P contains
equalities. However there is no loss of generality with assuming P full-dimensional: If this is not the case, P
can be transformed into another polytope which has the same number of integer points and is full-dimensional
in a lower dimensional space (see Verdoolage et al. (2004), (2005)).
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in a d-dimensional parametric polytope Pp. They extended Ehrhart's result by showing
that E(Pp) can be described by a nite set of multivariate quasi-polynomials
13 of degree d
in p, each being valid on a dierent validity domain. They also proposed an algorithm for
computing Ehrhart polynomials, based on the classical technique of interpolation. However,
this method is seriously limited because the computation time is generally exponential and,
in some cases, the algorithm can fail to produce a solution (Beyls (2004)).
To avoid these problems, an alternative approach for computing E(Pp) was proposed by
Verdoolaege et al. (2004). This method, known under the name of Parameterized Barvinok's
algorithm, is essentially an adaptation of Barvinok' algorithm (Barvinok (1994), Barvinok
and Pommersheim (1999)) to parametric polytopes. Barvinok's algorithm is a powerful tool
that guarantees the polynomial-time counting of integer points inside rational polytopes
(for xed dimension)14. The key idea is to encode all the integer points inside a rational






where x = (x1; : : : ; xd), z = (z1; : : : ; zd) and x
z = xz11 : : : x
zd
d . It is clear that, when P is
a polytope, this sum is a (Laurent) polynomial and the number of integer points in P is
equal to the number of monomials in the generating function. Thus, the number of integer
points in P can be obtained by rewriting f(P; x) as a reasonably short function and then
evaluating it at x = (1; : : : ; 1). Barvinok's method uses a crucial identity of Brion (1995) to
distribute the computation of f(P; x) on the vertices of P by considering the supporting cone
at each vertex15. Indeed, Brion's theorem states that the generating function of a polytope
is equal to the sum of the generating functions of the supporting cones at each vertex.
The remainder of Barvinok's procedure uses an inclusion-exclusion method to replace the
generating function of each supporting cone with a signed sum of polynomial number (in the
size of the data) of unimodular cones16. The generating functions of these cones are simple
and short rational functions that can be calculated explicitly. The function f(P; x) is then
13A multivariate quasi-polynomial is a multivariate polynomial expression where the coecients depend
periodically on each variable.
14It was latter rened and implemented in the software LattE by De Loera et al. (2004)
15The supporting cone at a vertex is the polyhedron dened by the constraints that are saturated by the
vertex, i.e., those for which equality holds for the vertex.
16Let v ,u1, . . . , ut in Rd. The (shifted) cone with apex v and generators u1, . . . , ut is the set C
dened by C = fv +
Pt
i=1 iuiji  0g. The cone C is called unimodular if its generators form a basis of
the lattice Zd.
17
the sum of short rational functions. Note that the point (1; : : : ; 1) is a pole of all these
functions, the evaluation of f(P; x) at this point is obtained by computing the residues17.
Parameterized Barvinok's algorithm, which allows to compute Ehrhart polynomials ana-
lytically, keeps the overall structure of Barvinok's algorithm, but takes into account validity
domains and handles periodic numbers. This technique always produces a solution in polyno-
mial time, when the number of variables in the inequalities is xed18. The results presented
in subsections 4:4 and 4:5 (forK = 5; 7; 9; 11) have been obtained by applying this algorithm.
4.2 A Preliminary Result
It can be noticed that, when the number N1 of voters in the largest group represents more
than 50% of the total number of voters, then the probability of casting a decisive vote only
depends, in each group, on the value of N1. More precisely, we have the following general
result (Recall that bxc denotes the integer part of x).





+ 1, then Piv(; 1) = 1
N1
and Piv(; k) = 1
N1+1
for k =
2; 3; :::; K.
Proof. Let xk be the value of the k






















k = 2; 3; :::; K, xk can take any integer value between 0 andNk (including 0 andNk) and when












; N1; N2; :::; Nk; :::; NK) = (N2 + 1)(N3 + 1):::(NK + 1)
and the result follows from relations (1.a) and (1.b). 
4.3 The Case of Two Groups
Let us consider the case where K = 2 i.e. the situation where the voters are partitioned into
two groups. This setting has been examined by various authors in the literature including
Beck (1975), Kleiner (1980), Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) and Le Breton et Lepelley
(2010).
17For detailed explanation, see De Loera (2004) and Verdoolage et al. (2005).
18For a rigorous description of this algorithm and for implementation details, see Verdoolage et al. (2005).
18
In such a case, if N is odd, then N1 > N2 as the two integers don't have the same parity.





; N1   1; N2












and Piv(; 2) =
1
N1 + 1
in accordance with Proposition 2.
4.4 Three groups of voters
In this section, we consider the case where the population is divided into three groups of
voters i.e. K = 3: N1  N2  N3 and N1 +N2 +N3 = bN + 1, with bN even.
The value of (
bN
2
; N1   1; N2; N3) is given by the number of integer solutions of the
following set of (in)equalities, where xk can be interpreted as the number of voters voting
Left in group k, k = 1; 2; 3:
0  x1  N1   1
0  x2  N2
0  x3  N3
x1 + x2 + x3 =
bN
2
Given the last equality, N3 = N  N1  N2 and the above set of inequalities reduces to:
0  x1  N1   1
0  x2  N2
0  x3  N  N1  N2
x1 + x2 + x3 =
bN
2
where the parameters satisfy:
N1  N2
2N2 +N1  N   1  0 and
N1 +N2  N + 1
A representation for the number of integer solutions of this set of inequalities with three
variables and three parameters (N1, N2 and N) can be derived by using the multiparameter





















; N1; N2   1; N3) and (
bN
2
; N1; N2; N3   1) can be derived in a

































Observe that we recover the results we have mentioned for two groups by taking N3 = 0.
From the above results, we can now derive the probability of casting a decisive vote for a
voter belonging to each of the three groups. We obtain :
Piv(; 1) =
(N3 + 1)(N2 + 1)



















+ 1 (in accordance with our preliminary result), and
Piv(; 1) =
4N21 + 4N1(N2   bN   2) + 4N22   4N2( bN + 1) + bN( bN + 2)
4N1(N2 + 1)(N1 +N2   bN   2) (2)
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Piv(; 2) =
4N21 + 4N1(N2   bN   1) + 4N22   4N2( bN + 2) + bN( bN + 2)
4(N1 + 1)N2(N1 +N2   bN   2) (3)
Piv(; 3) =
4N21 + 4N1(N2   bN) + 4N22   4N2 bN + bN2   2 bN   4)





In order to simplify the above three representations, let 1 = N1= bN and 2 = N2= bN
denote the proportion of voters in the rst and the second group. Replacing N1 by 1 bN and
N2 by 2 bN and assuming that bN is large give, for k = 1; 2; 3 and 1  0:50:
Piv(; k) ' 4
2
1 + 412   41 + 422   42 + 1




Let c3(1; 2) =
421+412 41+422 42+1
412(1+2 1) if 1  0:50 and c3(1; 2) = 1=1 if 1 > 0:50.
We nally obtain that, for N large, the probability of casting a decisive vote for a voter
belonging to an electorate divided in three groups is approximately equal to the Shapley-
Shubik index multiplied by c3(1; 2). We give in Table 3 some computed values of c3(1; 2)
for various values of 1 and 2.
1/2 1/3 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
1/3 2.250 - - - -
0.35 2.248 2.245 - - -
0.40 2.219 2.214 2.188 - -
0.45 2.145 2.143 2.130 2.099 -
0.50 2 2 2 2 2
> 0.50 1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1 1=1
Table 3 : Values of c3(1; 2)
These values show that the probability of casting a decisive vote is maximum when
1 = 2 = 1=3, i.e. when each of the three groups has the same size.
4.5 The Symmetric Case
We consider here the case with N1 = N2 = ::: = NK =
bN+1
K
and we assume that N = bN + 1












) is given as the number of integer solutions of the following set
of (in)equalities:
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0  xK 
bN+1
K
x1 + x2 + :::+ xK =
bN
2
For specic small values of K, it is fairly easy to obtain close forms of and of the proba-
bility of being pivotal as a function of the parameter N . Let us consider the rst values of
K.












, we proceed as follows. Let bK  bN+1
3
and m be the number of voters taken from the smallest group. Of course: 0  m  bK   1.
Given m, how many voters x2 can we take in the second group ?





 m. This bound is
derived when we chose the largest possible number (i.e. bK) in the third group. This integer
is larger than or equal to 0 when m   1
2
. On the other hand, the largest number x is
solution of m + x + 0 = 3
bK 1
2
i.e. x = 3
bK 1
2
 m. This integer is smaller than or equal tobK when m  bK 1
2
.
Case 1: m  bK 1
2
. In such case: x2 = bK   3 bK 12  m+ 1 = bK+12 +m+ 1
Case 2: m  bK 1
2






  0 + 1 = 3 bK 1
2
 m+ 1
From that, we deduce:

 bK   1; bK; bK = bK 12X
m=0























3 bK   1 bK   1
4
 
bK( bK   1)
2
+





 bK   1; bK; bK = 3 bK2 + 4 bK + 1
4
From that, we derive:
22
Piv() =
3 bK2 ++4 bK + 1
4 bK  bK + 12


















2 = 9N2 + 36N + 274N3 + 24N2 + 36N = 9(N + 1)4N(N + 3)
or equivalently
Piv() =
9( bN + 2)
4( bN + 1)( bN + 4) (5)
for bN = 2 modulo 6 (recall that bN + 1 must be an odd multiple of 3). Notice that these
results are consistent with the representations given in Section 2: Replacing N1 and N2 by
(N + 1)=3 in (2), (3) or (4) leads to (5).







= 2:25, in accordance with the result obtained in the preceding subsection
for 1 = 2 = 1=3.
























25( bN + 2)(23 bN2 + 276 bN + 928)
192( bN + 1)( bN + 6)3
for bN = 4 modulo 10. In this case, the limiting value of the probability of casting a








 K = 7: The probability of casting a decisive vote is given as:
Piv() =
48(841 bN6 + 35322 bN5 + 616300 bN4 + 3859680 bN3 + 23167384 bN2 + 67791768 bN + 66810120)
11520( bN + 1)( bN + 8)6
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For values of K higher than 11, the implementation of the Barvinok's algorithm demands
a very long computation time that prevents from obtaining some numerical results. The













Proposition 3: Let K be an odd number (K  3).









































) is the number of integer solutions of the
following parametric linear system:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:




0  xk 
N
K






We know by Ehrhart's theorem that this number is a quasi-polynomial of degree K   1 on
the variable N . Hence, '(K) is equal to the leading coecient of this quasi-polynomial.
The additive constants in the second member of the constraints do not aect this coecient,
'(K) is also the leading coecient of the quasi-polynomial computing the number of integer
solutions of the system
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8>>><>>>:
0  xk 
N
K






The system represents the dilatation by the factor N of the rational (K   1) dimensional
polytope Q dened by: 8>>><>>>:
0  xk 
1
K






By the second assertion of Ehrhart's theorem, and by denition of '(K), we know that
'(K) is equal to the relative volume of Q, which is the (normalized) volume in RK 1 of the
full-dimensional polytope P dened by:8>>><>>>:
0  xk 
1
K









Let Vol(P) be the volume of P. To compute this volume, we consider some particular subsets
of RK 1. Let  and 0 be the K   1-dimensional simplices dened by:
 = fx 2 RK 1 : xk  0 for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1 and x1 + : : :+ xK 1  1=2g
0 = fx 2 RK 1 : xk  0 for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1 and x1 + : : :+ xK 1  (K   2)=2Kg
It is easy to see that Vol(P) = Vol(A)  Vol(B), where:
A = fx 2  : xk  1=K; 8k = 1; : : : ; K   1g
B = fx 2 0 : xk  1=K;8k = 1; : : : ; K   1g
We only show how to compute Vol(A), the same method will be applied to obtain Vol(B).
For each i in f1; : : : ; K   1g let i = fx 2  : xi  1=Kg. More generally, for each non
empty subset S of f1; : : : ; K   1g, we dene S by S = \i2Si. Note that S = ; for
j S j> K 1
2
.
For S such that #S  K 1
2
, let #S = m and let tu be the translation of vector u, where
u is the vector of RK 1 dened by ui =   1K if i 2 S and ui = 0 if not. It is obvious that
25
tu(S) = (m), where (m) = fx 2 RK 1 : xk  0 for all k = 1; : : : ; K   1 and x1 +
: : :+xK 1  (K 2m)=2Kg. Since translations conserve volumes, and applying the formula
giving the volume of a simplex, we obtain:






On the other hand, we can write Vol(A) = Vol() Vol([K 1i=1 i). Applying the inclusion-






































































































































Using the analytical expression obtained in the previous Proposition, we can extend the
calculation of cK = K
K'(K) to larger values of K. The following table gives the exact value
of cK for K = 5 to 49 (K odd).
26
K 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
cK 2.995 3.577 4.076 4.521 4.925 5.298 5.647 5.976 6.288 6.584 6.870 7.143
K 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
cK 7.408 7.657 7.903 8.141 8.372 8.597 8.817 9.031 9.240 9.444 9.644
Table 4 : Exact values of cK
Notice that the limiting result obtained in this subsection can be easily extended to the
case where N is even and the population is divided into K groups of size N
K
. The integer
K can be odd or even and the unique assumption is that N is an even multiple of K.












)]. With slight modications in the proof of




























if K is even.
4.6 A Probabilistic Argument
To study the asymptotic behavior of the the above expression i.e. to understand how cK
behaves when K tends to 1, we develop a probabilistic argument. To this end, we will
consider as in the end of section 3 the probability of being pivotal from the perspective of a
small group of size N where  > 0 is xed instead of a group of size 1 as done until now.




















Xki and Nk =
N
K
The random variables S1N ; S
2
N ; :::; S
K
N are independent and identically distributed. Follow-
ing the argument used in Proposition 4 of Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981), we deduce
that for all k = 1; :::; K,
SkN
Nk
converges weakly to the uniform law on the interval [0; 1]
27





k where the random variables Uk are independent and identically distrib-
uted. Their common distribution is the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. From the central limit












is the standard deviation of the uniform variable on [0; 1]. We deduce that the






































when K is large





K 3 5 7 9 11 ::: 51 ::: 99q
6K

2: 393 7 3: 090 2 3: 656 4 4: 145 9 4: 583 5 ::: 9: 869 3 ::: 13: 750 5
Table 5 : Approximate values of cK
5 Further Considerations on Correlation and Parti-
tioning
In this paper, we have mostly focused on a specic pattern of correlation that we have called
the IAC partitioning model. It is important to recall that this model is specic on two
grounds. First, it is based on a partition of the individuals such that individuals belonging
to two dierent groups in that partition have independent preferences. Second, it has been
assumed that in each group the correlations among the preferences in the group were resulting
28
from the IAC model. In this last section, we keep the partitioning assumption but examine
two dierent generalizations of the existing IAC version.
In the IAC setting, the correlation coecient between the votes of two voters from the
same group is equal to 1
3
. Let us consider instead the case where the correlation coecient
between the votes of two voters is positive but arbitrary19 and denoted : Cov(Xik; Xjk), the
covariance between the votes of i and j when they belong to the same group is then equal
to 
4
























1 +  (s  1)
We observe that
p
NPiv(R; s) decreases with s and with . This is consistent with
intuition as an increase in s or an increase in  leads to more correlation among the votes
and less room for pivotality. However, in the case of perfect correlation i.e.  = 1; we need
to be more careful as we cannot use Petrov's theorem. The reason is easy to see in the case
where all the groups are of same size s. In such case the variables ZRk and W
R
i introduced
in the proof of Proposition 1 have respectively a span of s and a span of s   1. Only the
ZRk variables appear innitely often. To see what is going on, consider the case where s = 2
i.e. the case where the N random variables are grouped into M  N
2
packs of size 2. Let us
focus on the case where M is odd. In such case:






Since all the variables in the sum are independent, identically distributed with a maximal















19In appendix 3, we oer a slight generalization of the IAC model which allow to cover all conceivable
positive values of .
20Alternatively, it is also a direct consequence of Gnedenko 's theorem (1948) (theorem 1 in chapter 7 of
Petrov (1975)) as all the variables in the sum are independent, identically distributed with a maximal span









' 1: 128 4









 = 1 and s = 2. More generally, consider the case of an arbitrary value of s i.e. the
case where the N random variables are grouped into M  N
s
of size s which correspond to
M = N
s
independent and identically distributed Bernouilli random variables. Let us focus
on the case where M is odd. As above, we deduce that:
















































) in the neighborhood of
 = 1 is rather peculiar but corresponds to the fact that when  = 1, the voters belonging to




In the above generalization, the covariance is the same for all pairs but we could run
the same computations without assuming that the covariances are constant within each
group. An interesting situation of that kind appears in the Le Breton and Lepelley (2011)
study of the French electoral law of June 29 1820. This electoral law, known as the law
of double vote, has been used in France to elect the deputies from 1820 to 1830. France
was divided into a number of electoral districts (the so called French \departements") and
each district sent a number of deputies to the chamber. Each district was divided itself
into subdistricts (the so called \arrondissements"). Each arrondissement elected one deputy
and to be voter in an arrondissement, your amount of tax had to be above some xed level
(called the \cens"). In addition, the voters in the top quartile of the income distribution
of the voters in the departement were members of an additional electoral college which
elected D additional deputies. These \rich" voters had a double vote: they voted in their
arrondissement and also in the electoral college constituted at the level of the departement.
This explains the name which was given to this law. It was decided that 3
5
of the deputies
was elected by the arrondissements and 2
5
by the voters in the top colleges. Le Breton and
30
Lepelley (2011) study a symmetric version of that problem where there are K departements,
with A arrondissements in each departement and 4r+1 voters in each arrondissement where
r is an odd integer denoting the number of voters with two votes in that arrondissement.
The size N of the chamber is therefore K(A + D)21. A good approximation of the French
data at that time is given by K = 86, A = 3 and D = 2 leading to N = 430: 258
being elected in arrondissements and 172 elected by the top colleges. Hereafter, we will
limit however our attention to the case where K is odd. In the case where A = 3 and
D = 2, the 5K deputies are partitioned into groups of size 5. These legislators have in
common to be elected from the same territory. Even if we assume that the preferences of
the A(4r + 1) voters across the A districts are independent, the preferences of the deputies













prole of the ve votes in the jth departement where the rst three coordinates denote the
votes in the three arrondissements and the last two the votes in the top college. When r is

































































We note that the coecient of correlation  between any of the rst three variables

















where X lj = 1 if S
l
j  2r + 1 for l = 1; 2; 3 and
X lj = 1 if S
l
j  Ar+12 for l = 4; 5. Based on the Gaussian orthant probabilities, the matrix of








































































= 0:29849. Since the random








j are independent, identically distributed and have a span
equal to 1, by using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, we deduce that the
21They assumed that A is an odd integer and that D is an even integer.
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In this paper, we have studied the impact of correlation across preferences and votes on the
probability of being pivotal. The analysis has been conducted under a number of assumptions
and we think that it would be of interest to examine how far we can go without being too
much specic. One key assumption is the the neutrality among the two alternatives. We
have assumed that the two alternatives were similar ex ante. One interesting generalization
could consist in assuming that there is a partition of the population into groups where in each
group the preferences are as here correlated but also possibly biased towards one candidate.
The bias could of course vary from group to another. In such a setting a group could be
dened as a subset of individuals displaying some homogeneity dened through a vector of
characteristics.
We are not aware of an ambitious attempt to generalize the current theory to a setting
that would allow for dierences across alternatives. To the best of our knowledge, the only22
model along these lines is due to Beck (1975). He considers a population divided into two
groups of equal size. In the rst group, the votes are independent and people vote left with
probability p > 1
2
. In the second group, votes are also independent and people vote left with
probability 1   p. Beck estimates numerically the probability for a voter to be pivotal for
several values of the parameter p. Modulo a simple adjustment of the proof of Proposition
1, we obtain an asymptotic exact value of the probability of being pivotal in Beck's model.







When p = 1
2










= 0:921 32 and when p = 4
5
; we obtain 1p
2 4
25
= 0:997 36. Moving towards
polarization increases drastically the probability of being pivotal!
22See also Berg (1990) for another illustration.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Petrov's Local Central Limit Theorem23
Let k be an arbitrary xed positive integer. A sequence of random variables (yn)n1 is
said to be a k sequence if the number of dierent distribution functions in the sequence of
the distribution functions corresponding to (yn)n1 is equal to k. Consider a k sequence
of independent integer-valued random variables (yn)n1 each having nite variance. We
denote by F 1; :::; F l the l distributions which are non-degenerate and occur innitely often
in the sequence (F i)1ik. We denote by H











H1; H2; :::; H l

= 1, then Sup
N
pBn Prn (N)  1p2e  (N Mn)22Bn
 !n!1 0
7.2 Berk's Theorem
For each k = 1; 2,...let n = n(k) and m = m(k) be specied and suppose that yk1 ; y
k
2 ; :::; y
k
n
is an m dependent sequence of random variables with zero means24. Assume the following
conditions hold. For some  > 0 and some constants M and K:
(i) For some  > 0; E
yki 2+ M for all i and all k.
(ii) V ar
 






















is asymptotically normal with mean 0 and variance v.
7.3 Correlation
A simple and nice way to legitimate an arbitrary positive value of the correlation coe-
cient when we have a vector x  (x1; x2; :::; xn) of Bernouilli random variables such that
Pr (xi = 1) =
1
2
for all i = 1; 2; :::; n goes as follows. Let f be a continuous positive density
23Theorem 2 in Petrov (1975). In fact his result asserts a stronger claim namely that, under the stated
conditions, the uniform convergence holds true even if we alter the distribution of a nite number of terms
in the sequence. Other local versions of the Central Limit Theorem have been proved (Davis and Mc Donald
(1995), Gamkrelidze (1964), Mc Donald (1979), Mukhin (1991)). To the best of our knowledge, no such























independent whenever n > m.
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on [0; 1] assumed to be symmetric around 1
2
. Consider the generalized IAC25 model where p
is drawn in [0; 1] according to f and Pr (xi = 1 j p) = p for all i = 1; :::; n. Note that:






















since by assumption f(p) = f(1  p).




Consider the case where f is a symmetric beta distribution i.e. f(p) =  (2)
[ ()]2
p(1  p)
where  is a strictly positive parameter and   is the gamma function26. By assumption, it















When  ! 0, we have  ! 1 (perfect positive correlation) and when  ! 1, we have
! 0 (independence)
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